Habit
Habit is unthinking action, and Aristotle said 'Acts are done from habit which men do because they have often done them before.' Whilst compulsion is unpleasant and useless repetition of action, habit is pleasant and generally useful.
'Habit, whether acquired by mere familiarity or by effort, belongs to the class of pleasant things, for there are many actions not naturally pleasant which men perform with pleasure, once they have become used to them.'
Habit is unthinking action, and Aristotle said 'Acts are done from habit which men do because they have often done them before.' Whilst compulsion is unpleasant and useless repetition of action, habit is pleasant and generally useful.
'Habit, whether acquired by mere familiarity or by effort, belongs to the class of pleasant things, for there are many actions not naturally pleasant which men perform with pleasure, once they have become used to them.'
Reasoning
Aristotle points out that rational and reasoned action are to defined ends, achieving something that serves personal goals.
'Actions are due to reasoning when, in view of any of the goods already mentioned, they appear useful either as ends or as means to an end, and are performed for that reason.'
He also notes that when we act in a way that we believe to be rational then we also believe that it is good.
'Rational craving is a craving for good, i.e. a wish -- nobody wishes for anything unless he thinks it good.
Aristotle points out that rational and reasoned action are to defined ends, achieving something that serves personal goals.
'Actions are due to reasoning when, in view of any of the goods already mentioned, they appear useful either as ends or as means to an end, and are performed for that reason.'
He also notes that when we act in a way that we believe to be rational then we also believe that it is good.
'Rational craving is a craving for good, i.e. a wish -- nobody wishes for anything unless he thinks it good.
Passion:
Sometimes passion can lead to extreme action.
Passion is closely related to revenge, and anger curiously lessens when there is no prospect of vengeance.'To passion and anger are due all acts of revenge...no one grows angry with a person on whom there is no prospect of taking vengeance, and we feel comparatively little anger, or none at all, with those who are much our superiors in power.'
Aristotle notes that 'angry people suffer extreme pain when they fail to get their revenge'. Applying the pain-reduction principle, then perhaps it is not surprising that anger reduces in such circumstances.
Sometimes passion can lead to extreme action.
Passion is closely related to revenge, and anger curiously lessens when there is no prospect of vengeance.'To passion and anger are due all acts of revenge...no one grows angry with a person on whom there is no prospect of taking vengeance, and we feel comparatively little anger, or none at all, with those who are much our superiors in power.'
Aristotle notes that 'angry people suffer extreme pain when they fail to get their revenge'. Applying the pain-reduction principle, then perhaps it is not surprising that anger reduces in such circumstances.
Desire
Desire (also referred as appetite) is 'craving for pleasure'.
Whilst anger serves negative motivation, 'Appetite is the cause of all actions that appear pleasant'.
Aristotle pointed out that wealth or poverty is not a cause of action, although the appetite for wealth may well motivate.
'Nor, again, is action due to wealth or poverty; it is of course true that poor men, being short of money, do have an appetite for it, and that rich men, being able to command needless pleasures, do have an appetite for such pleasures: but here, again, their actions will be due not to wealth or poverty but to appetite.'
Source and Credits: Changing Minds